ACTION AND CRIME: A FINE-GRAINED APPROACH
ALVIN I. GOLDMANt
There is much to admire in Michael Moore's comprehensive and
resourceful treatment of the philosophy of action in the context of

criminal law.'

I am impressed by the degree to which he finds

classical metaphysical issues in the theory of action to be germane
to the interpretation and systematization of the criminal law. Many
of his positions strike me as plausible and well-defended, including

his causal-volitional approach to the nature of action. The main
topic on which he is not convincing is the defense of the coarsegrained view of act-token individuation, or what he calls the

"exclusivity thesis." 2
According to this thesis, all complex act-tokens are identical to
basic act-tokens, which are bodily movements. For example, the
complex act-token of Smith's killing Jones is identical to the basic
act-token of Smith's curling his finger (thereby firing a gun at
Jones). It is granted, of course, that the act-type killing is different
from the act-type curling one's finger. But a particular act of killing
is always identical to some particular bodily movement, according
to the coarse-grained theory.
This contrasts with the fine-grained theory, which maintains that
the above-mentioned act-tokens of Smith are two different, though
intimately related, actions.' Although the coarse-grained view is a
widely respected contender in the theory of action and is imaginatively applied by Moore to the legal context, it suffers from a
number of serious problems. Some of these Moore does not
address, and others are more damaging than he appreciates. I shall
present a case for the superiority of the (extreme) fine-grained view.
In addition to its purely metaphysical virtues, this approach is
helpful in the criminal law, especially for handling the notion of an
offense.
t Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona. B.A. 1960, Columbia University;
Ph.D. 1965, Princeton University. I thank Thomas Hudson for valuable research
assistance and extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.
' See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
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Six types of problems for the coarse-grained view have been
presented in the literature:4 (1) the problem of effects, (2) the
problem of causes, (3) the problem of modifiers, (4) the problem of
the by-relation, (5) the time problem, and (6) the spatial location
problem. Moore pays a good bit of attention to problems (5) and
(6), and he tries to show how they can be handled from a coarsegrained perspective, but he gives little or no attention to the first
four problems. I shall exposit and discuss these problems in order.
All six problems have the same general form. Whereas the
coarse-grained view is committed to the identity of many "pairs" of
act-tokens, there often appear to be properties that one member of
a pair possesses and the other member lacks. But if the acts differ
on any property, they cannot be identical, according to the Indiscernibility of Identicals principle.5 Thus, unless the appearance
of property disparity can be explained away, the identity claim
implied by the coarse-grained view, and hence that view itself, is
unsustainable.
I. THE PROBLEM OF EFFECTS

The first type of problem, the problem of effects, starts with the
assumption that acts have causal properties, such as producing
certain effects, results, or consequences. Suppose Ned plays the
piano, and his playing causes Dolly to fall asleep and Molly to wake
up. In virtue of these two effects, Ned can be credited with the
complex act of putting Dolly to sleep and the complex act of waking
Molly up. It is agreed, then, that there are the following act-tokens:
Ned's playing the piano (act A), Ned's putting Dolly to sleep (act
A'), and Ned's waking up Molly (act A"). The coarse-grained view
holds that these acts are one and the same: they are all identical to
certain basic acts of Ned, viz., his moving his hands and fingers at
a certain time and place, and hence identical to one another. But
can these identities be sustained? By hypothesis, Ned's playing the
piano (act A) has the property of causing Molly to wake up. But his
putting Dolly to sleep (A') appears to lack this property: it seems
false to say that Ned's putting Dolly to sleep causes Molly to wake
up, since this wrongly suggests that Dolly's falling asleep is somehow

4Relevant sources will be cited as the problems are discussed in turn.
5This principle says that if "two" objects, X and Y, are really one and the same
object, they must have all properties in common. Any discrepancy between the
properties possessed by X and those possessed by Yindicates that they are not strictly
one and the same object.
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causally implicated in Molly's awakening. That is not the intended
scenario. Dolly and Molly are in separate rooms, and their states
are unaffected by one another. Analogously, although act A has the
property of causing Dolly to fall asleep, act A" appears to lack this
property. Hence, A is not identical to either A' or A", contrary to
6
the coarse-grained view.
Moore gives brief attention, though only in a footnote, to this
dilemma.7 His remarks occur in the context of a larger discussion
of one of Judith Thomson's temporal-order problems.' Thomson
points out the oddity of saying "A's killing of B caused B to die
several hours later." Moore insists that the killing does occur before
the dying, and he explains the oddity of the quoted sentence as a
merely pragmatic feature of the usage. He observes that "[i]t is like
saying that the most discussed event of the decade (referring to a
large flood) caused more discussions to take place about it over the
next ten years than about any other event."9 When a predicate
repeats information already conveyed in a sentence's subject, as in
this example, pragmatic oddity results. Moore proposes to diagnose
my causal-effect cases in the same way. He acknowledges the oddity
in saying that a defendant's killing of a victim caused the defendant's gun to fire, but still maintains that the killing of the victim did
cause the defendant's gun to fire. Apparently he would offer the
same response to the piano case: Ned's putting Dolly to sleep does
have the property of causing Molly to wake up, and his awakening
Molly does have the property of putting Dolly to sleep, though it
sounds odd, given a full description of the circumstances, to say
these things. The problem of effects, he wishes to conclude, is not
an insuperable one for the coarse-grained view.
Moore's explanation, however, simply does not work for the
piano example, or for many other such examples. The descriptor
"Molly's waking up" does not repeat any information contained in
the subject expression "Ned's putting Dolly to sleep." So no appeal
6This sort of example is presented in ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN

ACTION 2-3 (1970) [hereinafter GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION] (asserting the fine-grained

theory of acts, which allows for differentiation of closely related acts); see also Alvin
I. Goldman, The Individuation of Action, 681. PHIL. 761, 761-74 (1971) [hereinafter
Goldman, Individuation].
7 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 289 n.19 (discussing the criticism of the coarsegrained view).
8 SeeJUDITHJ. THOMsON, ACTS AND OTHER EVENTs 47-50 (1977) (demonstrating

how acts may be differentiated based on the order in which they occurred).
9 MOORE, supra note 1, at 288.
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to repetition can explain the oddity in question. Of course, Moore
may not restrict pragmatic oddity to repetition, but he does not
identify any other source of pragmatic oddity that would cover the
present case. The situation, then, is as follows: if we take the
correctness of the coarse-grained theory as a premise, we can infer
that Ned's putting Dolly to sleep does cause Molly's waking up,
because Ned's putting Dolly to sleep is identical with his playing the
piano, which causes Molly's waking up. It would then follow that
the oddity of saying this is not a semantical oddity but merely some
sort of pragmatic oddity. But since the correctness of the coarsegrained theory is precisely the issue in dispute, its correctness
cannot be taken as a premise. Moore needs some independent
explanation of the oddity in some familiar pragmatic terms. In the
absence of such an explanation, the statement's falsity is the most
natural account of its oddity. If the statement is false, however, as
we seem forced to conclude, then there is no complete sharing of
properties, and Ned's putting Dolly to sleep is not identical to his
playing the piano, or to his moving his hands and fingers at the
relevant time and place.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CAUSES
The second problem arises not from the effects of acts, but from
their causes. There are cases in which one member of a pair of
putatively identical acts has the property of being partially caused
by a specific factor F, whereas the second member lacks the
property of being partially caused by F. I originally gave the
following case to illustrate this difficulty."° John answers the
phone and says "hello." He has just been quarreling with his wife
and is in a tense emotional state. As a result, he unintentionally
says "hello" very loudly. Consider now the following "pair" of acts:
John's saying "hello" and John's saying "hello" very loudly.
According to the coarse-grained theory, these acts are identical.
Hence, they should share all of the same properties. ButJohn's act
of saying "hello" very loudly is partially caused by his tense
emotional state, whereas John's act of simply saying "hello" is not
partially caused by this emotional state. The absence of causal
connection in the second case is supported by the absence of a
relevant counterfactual, or "but-for," condition. It is false that if he
had not been tense, he would not have said "hello." On the
'0 See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 3.
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contrary, he would have said "hello" anyway, even if he had not
been tense or upset. So the act of saying "hello" very loudly
possesses a relational property that the act of saying "hello" lacks,
and they cannot be identical. A similar example is given by Fred
Dretske:
My tug on the steering wheel of my car, for instance, doesn't cause
my car to move, much less to move at 63 mph. Rather, it causes
the 63-mph movement to be in that direction. My heavy foot is
responsible for the speed, the dirty carburetor for the intermittent
pauses, and the potholes in the road for the teeth-jarring vertical
component of the movement."
This example is best construed as focusing on an event (rather than
an action): the movement of the car. In the coarse-grained view,
there is just one event here. The various descriptions "the car's
moving," "the car's moving at 63 mph," and "the car's moving in
that direction" all refer to one and the same event. But this is
problematic for the reasons Dretske indicates. The car's moving in
that direction is partly caused by my tug on the steering wheel, but
this does not even partly cause the car's moving (simpliciter) or the
car's moving at 63 mph. Once again, identities implied by the
coarse-grained view seem to be unsustainable.
Before turning to ways in which a coarse-grained theory might
try to handle this difficulty, let us ponder the implications of
accepting the nonidentities endorsed by the (extreme) fine-grained
view by examining that view in more detail. Could John's saying
"hello" really be a distinct act from John's saying "hello" very loudly,
and could the car's moving, the car's moving at 63 mph, and the
car's moving in that direction be three distinct events, as the finegrained approach maintains? The initial implausibility of these
results may be dispelled by considering a.class of entities which
metaphysicians have found necessary or useful to acknowledge and
to which fine-grained act-tokens belong. This class of entities goes
by various names, such as "individual accidents," "abstract particulars," "tropes," or "property exemplifications." Two examples of
this category, outside the realm of action, are the whiteness of a
particular sheet of paper and the snub-nosedness of Socrates (or the
being white of that sheet of paper and the being snub-nosed of
Socrates). The whiteness of a particular sheet of paper should not

'1
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(1988).

REASONS IN A WORLD OF CAUSES

30

1568

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:1563

be confused with the universal (or property) whiteness itself, for the
universal is instanced by many things in the world, whereas the
whiteness of the paper is instanced only by the paper. The paper's
whiteness cannot exist apart from the particular piece of paper.
Another instructive bit of terminology for this metaphysical category
is Nicholas Wolterstorffs "cases."12 The whiteness of a particular
piece of paper is a "case" or "instance" of the universal, whiteness;
the snub-nosedness of Socrates is a "case" or "instance" of snubnosedness in general. It is plausible to hold that each case, trope,
or property exemplification is a case of just one universal, or
property, each. That is, the redness of a particular piece of paper
is a case or instance of just the universal, redness, not of the
universal, being colored, although of course redness is a "determinate" of the "determinable," being colored. Similarly, the squareness of a piece of paper is an instance of the property squareness,
though not an instance of the property four-sidedness. Analogously,
if John's saying "hello" and John's saying "hello" very loudly are
tropes or "cases," it is plausible to say that the former is an instance
of only one property, saying "hello," and the latter is an instance of
only one property, saying "hello" very loudly. Again, the car's
moving on a particular occasion is just an instance of the universal,
moving; the car's moving at 63 mph on the same occasion is just an
instance of moving at 63 mph (and not an instance of moving), and
so forth.
A subtle but important distinction needed here is that between
exemplifying a property and being an instance of, or case of, a property. 3 A piece of paper, a substance, exemplifies the universal
whiteness but is not an instance of it. In general, substances are not
instances of universals in this technical sense of "instance." Only
tropes, like the whiteness of the paper, are instances of whiteness.
In addition to being instances of universals, tropes may also
exemplify them. For example, the redness of a piece of paper may
exemplify, or "have," the property of being caused by the paper's
being dipped in red ink. The redness of the paper, however, is not
an instance of this causal property; it is only an instance of redness.
Similarly, in the account offered here, John's saying "hello" is an
instance of just one property, saying "hello," although it can
12

NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, ON UNIVERSALS:

AN ESSAY IN ONTOLOGY 13041

(1970).
"5See id. at 133-34; see also GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 11
(distinguishing the exemplification and instancing of a property).
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exemplify numerous properties. Similarly,John's saying "hello" very
loudly is an instance ofjust one property, saying "hello" very loudly,
although it too can exemplify many other properties. I shall call the
principle that each trope is an instance, or case, of exactly one
property the "single instance" principle. If this principle is adopted,
it is clear that in the action and event examples under discussion all
the act-tokens and event-tokens are distinct from one another,
because all are instances of properties that are distinct from one
another.
Several contributors to the literature, including Moore himself,
endorse something like the trope or property exemplification theory
without endorsing the single instance principle. 4 They claim that
a property exemplification can be an instance of several properties.
This is a perfectly intelligible position, and the metaphysical
expressions "trope" and "property exemplification" do not have
such an entrenched usage that we should complain about the
terminology being employed in this alternate way. However, if
rejection of the single instance principle is used to dispute the
distinctness of John's saying "hello" and John's saying "hello" very
loudly, or the distinctness of the car's moving, its moving at 63 mph,
and its moving in that direction, then the trope (or propertyexemplification) theory can no longer resolve the problem of causes.
A trope theory without the single instance principle cannot explain
why the car's moving at 63 mph and its moving in that direction
have different sets of causes, or causal factors.
Here the coarse-grained theorist will complain that accommodation of the problem of causes is purchased at the price of proliferating act- or event-tokens, and that this result is too high a price to
pay. Moore first complains about this price by talking of how
"busy" the fine-grained approach makes us: "[T]he sticky wicket is
to say that these are seven different particular acts that we do at the
very same time. This seems to make even the laziest of us very
busyl "' 5 On the fine-grained approach, however, busyness is not
a matter of the number of act-tokens one performs. (That would
not be a plausible account of busyness on any theory!) Instead, it
is a matter of the energy, industry, exertion, or attentiveness that an
action sequence consumes, and this bears no simple relation to the
14See MOORE, supra note 1, at 370; see asoJONATHAN BENNETT, EvENTS AND THEIR
NAMES 94 (1988); HughJ. McCann, IndividuatingActions: The Fine.GrainedApproach,
13 CAN.J. PHIL. 493, 497-99 (1983).
15 MOORE, supra note 1, at 111.
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number of acts performed.
On any theory, a person's mere
twiddling of her thumbs or wiggling of her toes can be regarded as
numerous act-tokens, but this need not make her very busy.
An apparently more serious problem is posed by Moore in the
following passage:
Suppose thatJohn kisses Mary tenderly on the cheek at noon of a

given day. How many events took place... ? On [Jaegwon] Kim's
view [a fine-grained view], quite a few: there is the event ofJohn
kissing Mary tenderly on the cheek, the event of John tenderly

kissing Mary, and the event of John kissing Mary on the cheek.
This strikes most people as absurd; Mary got kissed only once by

John, even if that event instantiated several distinct properties (of
being a tender kiss, of being a kiss on the cheek, and of being a
tender kiss on the cheek). 6

If the extreme fine-grained approach did have the indicated
consequence, it would indeed be in trouble. We certainly do not
want to say that there is more than one kiss, or more than one
kissing, on this occasion.
But if we handle the fine-grained
approach carefully, we do not have to get this counter-intuitive
result. There is just one act-token of kissing (by John of Mary) on
this occasion, that is, one instance of the act-type kissing. Admittedly, there are additional act-tokens of John such as his kissing (of
Mary) tenderly, his kissing (of Mary) on the cheek, and so on. But
none of these is an instance of precisely the act-type kissing; each is
an instance of a distinct act-type. So we do not have multiple
kissings, though we do have one kissing (of Mary), one kissing (of
Mary) tenderly, and so on. 7 Thus, the consequence we need to
avoid is successfully avoided."
16Id. at 370; cf. BENNETT, supra note 14, at 82 ("If Bertram kicked Candice only
once, most of us will infer that he gave her only one kick, but Kim must say that he
gave her many-his clumsy kick, his hard kick, his kick on her shin, and so on.").
17 I would say, however, that the phrase "John's tender kissing of Mary" denotes an
instance of the type "kissing Mary" (rather than "kissing Mary tenderly"). In the
phrase "John's tender kissing of Mary," "tender" picks out a property that John's
kissing of Mary exemplifies, rather than picking out a different type of which the cited
act is an instance, as we have in the phrase "John's kissing of Mary tenderly."
1" A problem would remain, however, if we let different descriptions of the same
patient or object of an action yield different act-types. Suppose, for example, that
Mary is John's wife and also Trudy's mother. Then is John's kissing his wife a
different act-token from John's kissing Trudy's mother? Ifwe take this variant of the
fine-grained approach, then we shall have multiple kissings by John on the same
occasion. See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 11. An alternative
approach is suggested byJaegwon Kim's treatment of the fine-grained approach, in
which two event-tokens are the same if they involve the same objects, however these
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Another way that coarse-grained theorists attack the fine-grained
theory is to accuse the latter of confusing acts, or events, with facts.
This sort of objection is leveled by Jonathan Bennett, following
Zeno Vendler.19 Both Vendler and Bennett distinguish between
two kinds of sentence nominalizations: perfect and imperfect
nominals. In the nominal expression "Quisling's betrayal of
Norway," "betrayal" is perfectly a noun, whereas "betraying" in the
gerundial expression "Quisling's betraying Norway" is a sort of noun
that still has a verb alive and kicking in it. Vendler and Bennett
claim that perfect nominals name events and actions, whereas
imperfect nominals (favored by fine-grained theorists) instead name
facts. Facts are indeed finely individuated, but not actions, which
are what we are interested in. Thus, when fine-grained action
theorists, or event theorists, talk about their favored entities, they
are really talking about facts. Actions and events are coarse-grained
kinds of entities.
Hugh McCann persuasively deflates this line of attack.2"
Imperfect nominals like "Quisling's betraying Norway" or "John's
singing the Marseillaise" do not name facts. The things they name
have beginnings and endings, and they last for some period of time.
Facts, on the other hand, do not have beginnings or endings and do
not last for periods of time. It is wrong to say that the fact that
Quisling betrayed Norway, or the fact that John sang the Marseillaise, began or ended at a certain time. Nor is it correct to say that
the fact that Quisling betrayed Norway, or the fact that John sang
the Marseillaise, had a particular duration. Facts are arguably true
propositions, and propositions do not occur or last for any period
of time, and do not begin or end. So the sorts of entities picked
out by imperfect nominals are definitely not facts, even if their
grain of individuation approximates that of facts.2' The claim that
objects are described or characterized. On that approach,John's kissing his wife is
the same act-token (or event-token) as John's kissing Trudy's mother, and we avoid
the prospect of multiple kissings. SeeJaegwon Kim, Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and
the Concept of Event, 70J. PHIL. 217, 222-36 (1973); Jaegwon Kim, Events as Property
Exemplifications, in ACTION THEORY 159, 166-67 (Myles Brand & Douglas Walton eds.,
1976) [hereinafter Kim, Events].
19 See BENNETT, supra note 14, at 26-31; ZENO VENDLER, LINGUISTICS IN
PHILOSOPHY 122-31 (1967) (discussing differences between facts and acts).
20 See McCann, supra note 14, at 500-01. McCann's reply is directed at another
proponent of this line of criticism, Hector-Neri Castafieda. See Hector-Neri
Castafieda, Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and PhilosophicalMethod, 13
NouS 235, 235-60 (1979). However, the same reply is appropriate for Bennett.
21Actually, Bennett himself seems to acknowledge this, when he distinguishes
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imperfect nominals merely denote facts has been regarded as
significant by philosophers because we already knew that propositions are finely individuated. The question is whether any entities
"in the world," any entities that partake in causal relations, have
comparable fineness of grain. Imperfect nominals may denote
finely-individuated entities, but if these merely turn out to be facts,
the lesson for ontology is insignificant. Thus, McCann's point that
these finely-individuated entities are not facts, but things of a more
"worldly" and temporal nature, is important.
Having elucidated and defended the fine-grained approach in
more detail, let us now return to the problem of causes and see
whether the coarse-grained theory provides an alternate solution.
Return to Dretske's driving case. Instead of saying that the car's
moving, its moving at 63 mph, and its moving in that direction are
distinct event-tokens, the coarse-grained approach can say that there
is but a single event which has many aspects or facets.2 There is
just one car movement, but it has multiple facets such as speed and
direction which do not all share the same causes. Thus, the coarsegrained approach tries to circumvent the problem of causes by
saying that it is not different acts or events, but differentfacets of a
single act or event, that have different causes.
Although this account does avoid the need for finely-individuated acts, it does not get away from the ontological need for finelyindividuated tropes. After all, what are "aspects" or "facets" (of an
event or piece of behavior), and how are they to be individuated?
If these are to be the entities that are caused by preceding factors,
they will have to be individuated very finely. The speed of the
movement will have to be distinct from the direction of the
movement, because the speed facet has different causes from the
direction facet. So the kinds of entities needed are things like themovement-being-at-63-mph and the-movement-being-in-that-direction, which look very much like finely-individuated tropes of the sort
which the fine-grained approach calls "event-tokens." Thus, we wind
up with precisely similar sorts of entities as the fine-grained
approach posits, the only difference being that the subjects of the
tropes are now coarse-grained events rather than substances. It is
important to notice that this approach cannot get away with saying

"that [S]" nominals from imperfect gerundial nominals, and admits that the
grammatical behavior of these types of expressions differ. BENNETr, supra note 14,

at 7-8.
2 Cf. DRETSKE, supra note 11, at 30-31.
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that the speed and direction of the driving are just properties rather
than property instances, for properties themselves do not participate in causal relations. We cannot say that the universal "at 63
mph" is caused by the pressure of my foot on the accelerator,
because universals are not caused by anything. It is only the moving
at 63 mph, a trope or property instance, that is caused by factors like
23
the pressure of my foot on the accelerator.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MODIFIERS
We turn now to the third problem for the coarse-grained view,
the problem of modifiers. One of the tasks of event theory or
action theory is to provide an analysis of the logical form of
sentences ascribing events or actions. A particular way of executing
this task has been proposed by Donald Davidson, a leading
proponent of the coarse-grained theory. This approach initially
looks as if it sustains and indeed favors the coarse-grained theory;
certainly it was so conceived by Davidson. But as Terence Parsons
and others have shown, it in fact raises some grave difficulties for
24
the coarse-grained theory.
Consider the sentence, "Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with
a knife." What is the logical form of this sentence? Although it
contains no referring expression that purports to denote an event,
it can be construed as implicitly asserting the existence of such an
event.2 5 On Davidson's proposal, it can be paraphrased roughly as
23 Some commentators worry about causal arguments for nonidentities on the
grounds that causal relations may not be "extensional." "Believes that" is the
standard illustration of a nonextensional context: a context in which expressions
designating identical things need not be intersubstitutable. For example, even though
"the mayor" and "the pickpocket" designate one and the same individual, the
sentence "Oscar believes that the mayor is an upstanding citizen" may be true
whereas the sentence "Oscar believes that the pickpocket is an upstanding citizen" is
false. Some commentators have worried that "causes" is similarly nonextensional.
Nowadays, however, most commentators concede that "causes" is an extensional
context, at least when it is flanked by genuine event-referring expressions. See
generally DONALD DAVIDSON, CausalRelations, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 14962 (1980). This article was instrumental in getting people to appreciate this. If this
is correct, then differences in causal properties are legitimate threats to identity
claims, as I have been arguing.
2 See TERENCE PARSONS, EVENTS IN THE SEMANTICS OF ENGLISH 153-66 (1990)
(noting that the coarse-grained view is probably not consistent with the underlying.
event view). The difficulties for the coarse-grained theory are not a major theme of
Parsons's book; indeed, he claims to have only slight interest in the problem of event
individuation. Nonetheless, the problems he and others have identified for the
coarse-grained theory are serious.
2 See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, The Logical Form of Action Sentences, in ESSAYS
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follows: "There is an event e such that e is a stabbing, e had Brutus
as its agent, e had Caesar as its object, e was (done) in the back, and
e was (done) with a knife." Notice that in this paraphrase the
modifiers "in the back" and "with a knife" are both predicated of
the same existentially quantified event variable, e. This paraphrase
and similar such paraphrases thereby hold out the promise of
elucidating similar action sentences without proliferating actions or
events. For example, consider the sentence, "John flipped the
switch, thereby turning on a floodlight and alerting a burglar." This
sentence might be paraphrased as, "There is an event e such that e
is a switch-flipping, e had John as its agent, e caused a floodlight to
go on, and e caused a burglar to become alert." Here too the
paraphrase invokes only a single action. There is nothing (so far)
to suggest that John's flipping the switch, his turning on a floodlight, and his alerting a burglar are distinct act-tokens, as the finegrained approach would claim.
As Parsons points out, however, there is a clear problem for
26
identifying these act-tokens that stems from their modifiers.
Consider the act-token of John's alerting a burglar. This was done
with the floodlight; in other words, it is a property of this act-token
that it had the floodlight as its instrument. Next consider the acttoken of John's flipping the switch. This was not done with the
floodlight; it lacks the property of having the floodlight as its
instrument. Thus, we again have a putative identity between a pair
of act-tokens which in fact violates the Indiscernibility of Identicals
principle. This difficulty cannot be evaded by the account of logical
form that coarse-grained theorists offer. According to their
account, the modifier phrase "with the floodlight" expresses a
property that holds of some action that is both a switch-flipping and
a burglar-alerting. But this account does not get things right.
Although it is true that the burglar-alerting is done with the
floodlight, it is false that the switch-flipping is done with the
floodlight. So there is no single action (in the present case) that is
both a switch-flipping and a burglar-alerting.
Other such examples are readily produced. Suppose we have
agreed that I shall signal that I am the secret agent by saying that I
have come to pick up the garbage. Then, if I say that I have come
to pick up the garbage, I thereby signal that I am the agent. The

ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra note 23, at 105.
26 See

PARSONS, supra note 24, at 164-65.
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coarse-grained theory would of course maintain that the saying is
the signaling; there is just one act-token here, not two. But there is
ample reason to distinguish them. The signaling is secret, but the
saying is not. (By openly saying that I have come for the garbage I
secretly signal that I am the agent.) Furthermore, even if the saying
is clumsy, the signal need not be clumsy. (Perhaps the agreed-on
signal is to say clumsily that I came for the garbage.) Thus,
"secretly" modifies the signaling but not the saying, and "clumsily"
modifies the saying but not the signaling. So the saying and the
signaling cannot be identical 2 7 Here I see no prospect at all for
a satisfactory response from the coarse-grained theory.
IV. THE BY-RELATION PROBLEM

The Indiscernibility of Identicals principle should be formulated
in terms of relations as well as properties. If A = A', then if A bears
any relation R to some object B, A' must also bear R to B. If there
is any disparity in such relationships, then A and A' are not
genuinely identical.2" The fourth problem for the coarse-grained
view concerns a kind of relation that seems to be indicated in many
action sentences, a relation that one act bears to another in being
the "way," the "method," or the "means" by which the latter is
executed. 9 When we say, for example, "John alerted the burglar
by turning on the floodlight," we seem to indicate that a certain acttoken of John's, his turning on the floodlight, is the way or method
by which he performs another act-token, his alerting of the burglar.
This "by-relation" or "way-relation" can be used to raise problems
for the coarse-grained view.
According to the coarse-grained view, every complex action is
identical with some basic action. In the burglar-alerting example,
the basic action is John's moving his finger. Thus, John's alerting
' See id. at 158. A similar example was presented in my book A Theory of Human
Action. See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 4. Suppose I owe Smith two
dollars. Reaching into my pocket for some cash, I discover two single-dollar bills and
one two-dollar bill. I have a fondness for two-dollar bills, but I recall that Smith goes
wild over them. So I repay him with the two-dollar bill. The coarse-grained theory
holds that my act of repaying him is the same as my act of giving him the two-dollar
bill. But the latter is supererogatory (above and beyond the call of duty), whereas the
former is not.
a This formulation could have been used for the problems of effects and causes.
The terms "method" and "means" are less felicitous than "way" because the
former imply something about the agent's intent or purpose, whereas the by-relation
in question does not presuppose any purpose or intent by the agent.
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the burglar is allegedly identical to John's moving his finger (when
it is poised on the light switch). Now we know that John's turning
on the floodlight stands in the by-relation to his alerting the burglar.
That is, his turning on the floodlight is the way by which he alerts
the burglar. So if his alerting the burglar is genuinely identical to
his moving his finger, then his turning on the floodlight must stand
in the by-relation to his moving his finger. That is, his turning on
the floodlight must be the way by which he moves his finger. But
this last suggestion is absurd. There is no way by which he moves
his finger (this being a basic act)-certainly not by turning on the
floodlight! So of the two putatively identical acts, alerting the
burglar and moving his finger, his turning on the floodlight has the
by-relation to the former but not to the latter. Hence, the two acts
are distinct rather than identical."0
Consider a second example. Jasper is playing chess. At the time
in question, he moves his hand (A,), thereby moving his queen to
king-knight-seven (A 2), thereby checkmating his opponent (A3),
thereby giving his opponent a heart attack (A 4). Act A., checkmating his opponent, stands in the by-relation to act A 4, giving the
opponent a heart attack. If the coarse-grained theory is right, act A,
is identical to act A 2, moving his queen to king-knight-seven. Hence,
act A. must also stand in the by-relation to act A 2. But it is
obviously wrong to say that Jasper moves his queen to king-knightseven by checkmating his opponent.
Adherents of the coarse-grained theory might try to evade these
problems by denying that "by" governs descriptions of act-tokens in
the relevant sentences. Parsons, among others, makes this suggestion." He points out: "['By'] does not seem to be an ordinary
preposition taking ordinary [noun phrases] as objects." 2 For
example, we do not say things like "John alerted the burglar by his
turning on the floodlight," or "Mary paid the bill by the writing of
the check." So perhaps the "by"-phraseology should be analyzed in
some other way, not as expressing a relation between act-tokens.
Another possibility, also suggested by Parsons, is that "by" might
create a nonextensional context; such contexts are infamous for
so The problem of the by-relation was first identified in my book

A Theory of

Human Action, see GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 5, though my present

formulation of it differs slightly from the original one.
31 See PARSONS, supra note 24, at 103.
32Id.
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violating the substitutivity of genuine identicals3 3 But it is hard to
find convincing evidence for this possibility, as Parsons acknowledges. 4 He suspects, as I do, that "by" stands for an extensional
relation between two acts, so that the argument does indeed prove

that many pairs of acts alleged to be identical by the coarse-grained
theory are actually different.
A third response to the by-relation argument is offered by
Norvin Richards. 5 Richards asks us to consider Gerald Ford, then
the President of the United States and the most powerful American
citizen. Although these are indisputably the same person, he is the
most powerful American by virtue of being President, but he is not
President by virtue of being the most powerful American. So there
seems to be an "in-virtue-of"-relation, similar to the by-relation,
which creates analogous difficulties for identifying the President
with the most powerful American. But surely that President is (or
was) the most powerful American. So there is clearly something
wrong, Richards suggests, with my line of argumentation.
If I had tried to prove that the subjects or agents of the acts in my
example were nonidentical, Richards would have a good case against
me. But I was only trying to prove that the two acts are nonidentical. The analogous thesis for Richards's own example would
be the thesis that Ford's being President of the United States is not
the same state of affairs as Ford's being the most powerful American
citizen; and I think that this thesis is pretty well supported by the
considerations he adduces. There does indeed seem to be an "inss Id.
' An argument for nonextensionality is presented, however, by Carl Ginet. See
CARL GINET, ON AcTiON 54 (1990). Ginet asks us to consider S's playing a C-major
chord (at time t) and S's simultaneously playing a C, an E, and a G (at time t). Ginet
says that the by-relation apparently holds here, because it would be correct to say that
S plays a C-major chord "by" simultaneously playing a C, an E, and a G. But it is also
true, says Ginet, that these two acts are identical. So the by-relation should hold in
the opposite direction as well; but it does not, since it would be false to say that S
simultaneously plays a C, an E, and a G "by" playing a C-major chord. Hence, the byrelation must be nonextensional. The flaw in this argument, I think, is Ginet's
assumption that the two acts are identical. I suspect that they are distinct, though
related via the "by" of composition or constitution. (Philosophers sometimes suggest
that a particular statue is composed of, or constituted by, a hunk of marble but is not
identical with that hunk of marble. The relation of composition or constitution
appears to be an antisymmetric relation, for it is odd to say, conversely, that the hunk
of marble is composed of, or constituted by, the statue.) This compositional byrelation is different from the one I am focusing on, which I have previously called the
"by" of level-generation. See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 20-21.
" See Norvin Richards, E Pluribus Unum: A Defense of Davidson'sIndividuation of
Action, 29 PHIL. STUD. 191, 191-98 (1976).
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virtue-of'-relation that distinguishes these states of affairs, just as
the by-relation distinguishes John's moving his finger from his
alerting the burglar.
Obviously, if the act-identities claimed by the coarse-grained
view are rejected, we must at least provide for an intimate relation-

ship between (or among) the different acts. This is precisely what
the by-relation provides. In earlier works, I have tried to explain
and systematize this by-relation."5 Although my positive account
of the by-relation may have had some flaws, 7 I believe that there
is a by-relation that stands ready to be analyzed. Whatever the
details of such an analysis, we can depict the structural relationships
of sets of act-tokens that are identical according to the coarsegrained view with the help of action diagrams.38 A diagrammatic
treatment of the piano-playing example is presented below.
Ned's putting Dolly

Ned's waking up

to sleep

Molly

Ned's playing the piano

Ned's moving his hands
and fingers
In this diagram circles represent act-tokens. A vertical or diagonal
line connecting a lower circle to a higher circle indicates that the
act-token represented by the former stands in the by-relation to the
act-token represented by the latter. For example, Ned's putting
Dolly to sleep is done by (his) playing the piano, and his playing the
piano is done by (his) moving his hands and fingers. In other

36 See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 20-48; Goldman, Individuation,
supra note 6, at 762-65, 773-74.
37 See BENNETT, supra note 14, at 203-12 (arguing, inter alia, that my arguments
hinge too much on the semantics of event-names and also that augmentationgeneration has no usefulness in the analysis, since for the theory to hold true logically
independent truths must be equivalent); Michael Bratman, Individuationand Action,
33 PHIL. STUD. 367, 371-74 (1978) ("Goldman's relation of generation is insensitive
to the distinction between performing an action andsimultaneously undergoinga change
as a result of an action one is performing."); Castafieda, supra note 20, at 246-51 (arguing
that my analysis of level-generation fails to capture the intended formal properties of
the by-relation).
's These were first presented in GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 20-48.
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terminology I have introduced, we may say that his moving his
hands and fingers level-generates his playing the piano, which in turn
level-generates both putting Dolly to sleep and waking Molly up.
The level-generational relation is clearly transitive; so Ned's moving
his hands and fingers also level-generates his putting Dolly to sleep
and his waking Molly up. As the diagram also indicates, not all
pairs of acts belonging to such a set have the level-generational
relation to one another (in either direction). Ned's putting Dolly to
sleep does not level-generate his waking up Molly, nor vice versa, as
our earlier discussion suggested.39 In general, sets of acts of this
sort form a tree-like diagram with a basic act at the root. Thus,
although the fine-grained view posits multiple acts where the coarsegrained view posits just one, the multiple fine-grained acts form a
highly structured array, and the relationships composing this array
40
are of considerable theoretical interest.
V. THE TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL PROBLEMS

The fifth and sixth problems, the temporal and spatial location
of act-tokens, are dealt with much more extensively by Professor
Moore, and what I shall say here is somewhat different from my
thread of argumentation in the preceding Sections. I have a fair bit
of sympathy with what Moore says about the temporal and spatial
locations of acts. The main point I shall press is that these positions
are equally available to the fine-grained theorist, contrary to what
Moore claims.
Since the issues of space and time are quite analogous, it will
suffice, I believe, to confine our attention to the temporal questions,
because what we say there will carry over, mutatis mutandis, to the
spatial domain. Briefly, fine-grained theorists usually say that a
complex act such as a killing spans the time of the agent's basic act
to the time of the victim's death. Call this the "long view" of a
39 See supra part I.
40 For an example, see Holly M. Smith, Moral Ascription Theory (Dec. 24, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), which explores the moral statuses of
the various acts on a single act-tree. Some acts on an act-tree, for example, an act of
keeping or breaking a promise, may have intrinsic moral rightness or wrongness.
Other act-tokens on the same act-tree, especially lower acts on the tree, may "inherit"
moral status from these. A linguistic utterance per se, for example, is presumably not
intrinsically wrong, but ifit level-generates an act of telling a lie, it may inherit moral
wrongness from that higher act. Acts that "branch off" from the basic act, for
example, frightening away a mosquito (by expulsion of breath), would not inherit
moral wrongness even if they are on the same act-tree.
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killing. Since the basic action is commonly much shorter in
duration, the correctness of the long view would clearly refute the
coarse-grained theory, since the basic action and the killing would
have different temporal properties. Coarse-grained theorists therefore favor a "short view" of a killing, and this clearly follows from
their identification of any complex act like a killing with an
appropriate basic action. It remains to be decided which is correct:
the long view or the short view. Unfortunately, there are intuitive
difficulties for each position.
Against the short view, we have Judith Thomson's argument that
we cannot say that the victim's death occurs several hours after the
defendant killed him.4 1 That sounds odd. Yet that is what the
short view requires us to say. Against the long view, we have
Moore's observation, following Donald Davidson's point, that it
requires us to say of a murderous queen who dies before her
poisoned victim that she is still killing him when she herself is
dead.42 But this sounds preposterousl
Moore proceeds to argue that although the oddities afflicting
the short view can be explained away satisfactorily, the oddities
afflicting the long view cannot. In defense of the short view, he says
that a killing does not last until the victim's death; it is merely that
the basic action that causes the death does not acquire the property
"cause of death" (and hence the property of being a killing) until
the death occurs.43 This by itself does not explain away Thomson's
usage oddities, but Moore claims that these can be explained away
44
as mere pragmatic oddities, for reasons partly discussed earlier.
No comparably satisfactory explanations are available, claims Moore,
of the oddities afflicting the long view. He writes:
I conclude that the location implications of either the extreme
or the moderate fine-grained metaphysics of complex actions leads
to absurdities that cannot be explained away, whereas the location
implications of the coarse-grained metaphysics of complex actions
lead only to apparent absurdities that can be explained away in a
satisfactory manner.45
Although I am not fully persuaded that the balance of evidence
favors the short view, as Moore claims, I am impressed by the need
41 See Judith J. Thomson, The Time of a Killing, 68J. PHIL. 115, 115-20 (1971).
42 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 285.
43 See id. at 285-86.
44 See supra part I.
45 MOORE, supra note 1, at 292.
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for the law to adopt this position at least for some of its purposes.
The simultaneity principle for murder, for example, requires that
the intent to kill be simultaneous with the act of killing, and the
courts have in this situation decided that the time of a killing is the
same as the time of the basic action. 6 But suppose, arguendo,
that Moore is right that the short view of complex actions fares
better on the whole. Does this decisively confirm the coarse-grained
theory? Only if the fine-grained theory is totally wedded to the long
view, as Moore clearly believes. He writes:
Where the policies behind legal doctrines require the asking of the
metaphysical questions of when an action was done, the courts
have located complex actions at their source, in the corresponding
basic actions. Such locationpresupposes the
coarse-grainedmetaphysics
4
identifying complex actions with basic ones. 7
Given the state of the literature in action theory, it may be reasonable of Moore to believe the emphasized sentence, asserting that
only the coarse-grained theory can accommodate the short view.
But although this belief may be reasonable, it is not correct.
It is true that what Moore calls the moderate fine-grained theory
is committed to the long view. Indeed, Moore virtually defines
"moderate fine-grained theory" as the view that complex acts have
parts or components that include both basic acts and intermediate
and final results of these acts picked out by complex action
descriptions. 4 But is the extreme fine-grained theory committed
to the long view? 49 The crucial feature of this position (as I understand Moore's terminology) is that it not only regards pairs of acts
like shooting and killing to be nonidentical, but also pairs of acts
46

See id. at 299-300. As Moore points out, however, the law has other purposes
for which killings are dated rather differently. In applying the statute of limitations,
for example, the courts date killings from the time death occurs, not from the time
of the basic action nor from the time of that action's first effects on the victim's body.

See id.
at 298.
4
1Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
48 Commentators who defend the componential view, which Moore equates with
the "moderately fine-grained view," include LAWRENCE H. DAVIS, THEORY OF ACTION
(1979); GINET, supra note 34; IRVING THALBERG, PERCEPTION, EMOTION AND ACTION
(1977); THOMSON, supra note 8; Monroe C. Beardsley, Actions and Events: TheProblem

of Individuation, 12 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1975); Lawrence H. Davis, Individuation of

Actions, 67J. PHIL. 520 (1970); Thomson, supra note 41.
" The usually cited defenders of the fine-grained view are Jaegwon Kim and
myself. See Kim, Events, supra note 18, at 159-63; Jaegwon Kim, Events and Their
Descriptions: Some Considerations,in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL G. HEMPEL 198, 198-

213 (Nicholas Rescher ed., 1970);Jaegwon Kim, On the Psycho-PhysicalIdentity Theory,

3 AM. PHIL. Q. 227, 227-35 (1966).
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like saying "hello" and saying "hello" loudly. There is nothing in
this practice of individuation, however, that constitutes a commitment to the componential view, so it remains open to defenders of
the extreme fine-grained theory to take the short view rather than
the long view on the question of temporal extent.5" If our earlier
discussion is correct, there are already ample arguments against the
coarse-grained theory and in favor of the fine-grained theory
without appealing to temporal disparities.5
So a fine-grained
theorist might join Moore in accepting the short view, although not
for his reasons.
This point needs some clarification. The fine-grained theorist
will not admit, of course, that the temporal span of a complex
action matches that of its corresponding basic action simply because
the complex action is the basic action. A fine-grained theorist will
not concede this "because" statement at all. Nonetheless, she might
admit that the respective temporal spans coincide. What considerations might support this position? According to the extreme finegrained theory, an action is a property-exemplification, or trope. So
the temporal span or duration of an act-token must be the period
over which the agent exemplifies the act-type in question. When
does an agent exemplify the act-type of killing, or any other causally
complex act? Does the exemplifying take place throughout the
period until the final causal result has occurred? Or does the
exemplifying occur just when the basic action that "level-generates"
the complex action occurs? I am inclined to think that this is a
rather indeterminate matter, which would explain why the courts
have had such difficulties with these issues, as Moore documents.52
But I see no barrier to the fine-grained theorist's adopting the short
view as slightly preferable on the whole. After all, what is a killing?
At first approximation, it is a causing of death. When does such
causing take place? It is plausible to say that the causing occurs at
the same time as the pertinent basic action (that is, the basic action
that level-generates the causing of death). This does not entail that
the causing is the basic action (say, moving one's finger). The fine" For myself, I was deliberately rather noncommittal about temporal questions in
A Theory of Human Action. See GOLDMAN, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 6, at 21-22, 3537, 45-46. In The Individuationof Action, I did endorse a temporal argument against
the coarse-grained theory, and by implication I endorsed the long view of a killing;
but this was in a brief paragraph which played a very minor and detachable role in
the discussion. See Goldman, Individuation,supra note 6, at 767.
"' See supra parts I-IV.
52 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 293-301.
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grained theory excludes this because it is an instance of the type
causing death, not of the type moving one's finger. Thus, the
killing may be simultaneous with the basic action without being
identical to it. An analogous position may be adopted for spatial
location. So even if the short view is right or preferable on the
whole, as Moore contends, this does not refute the fine-grained
approach. Since Moore treats the temporal and spatial arguments
as the principal arguments against the coarse-grained theory, he
might be surprised to find a fine-grained theorist willing to yield
ground on the spatiotemporal questions. As we have seen, though,
there are four types of arguments against the coarse-grained theory
and in favor of the fine-grained theory, quite apart from the
temporal and spatial arguments.
Let me conclude this Section with a different conjecture about
spatiotemporal location. I suspect that our conceptualization of
actions, including their spatiotemporal locations, is powerfully
driven by features of the language used in ascribing or naming
them. Since simple action ascriptions are of subject-predicate form,
we conceive of an act's primary location as the place of the agent
and the time of the agent's pertinent bodily movement. Some
evidence for this is that when an action sentence or nominalization
is put into passive form, the primary place and time seem to change.
Intuitively, the primary location of Jones's-being-killed-by-Smith
seems to be where Jones is, although the primary location of
Smith's-killing-Jones seems to be where Smith is. Complex actions
also seem to have secondary locations, however: namely, where the
patients or objects of action are located. Perhaps complex actions
have tertiary locations too: along the paths from agents to patients
(or objects).
Distinguishing between primary and secondary
locations would explain why we have competing intuitions, pulling
us alternately toward the short view and toward the long view. It
would also partly explain the difficulties courts have had in finding
a firm and consistent doctrine on the spatiotemporal locations of
complex actions. This compromise position, however, only makes
sense on the fine-grained theory. The coarse-grained theory is
incompatible with the primary/secondary story, because the only
location of a complex action, according to that theory, is the place
of the agent and the time of the basic action.
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VI. OFFENSES AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In this final Section, I want to illustrate how the fine-grained
theory can be conceptually useful in the criminal law. Some of the
most fascinating problems in the law that intersect with action
theory are ones pertaining to the double-jeopardy requirement,
which Moore discusses so intriguingly in part III of his book. The
points I shall address arise in the context of the double-jeopardy
issue.
The first point I wish to make concerns the notion of an
"offense" as it occurs in the law. This notion has the same sort of
type-token ambiguity as the notions of action and event. Clearly,
drunk driving, wrong-side-of-the-road driving, and excessively speedy
driving are all types of offense, so the notion of an offense-type is
uncontroversial. But it is also evident that "offense" sometimes
refers to act-tokens. For example, when the federal constitution says
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb,"53 it is clearly talking about offensetokens. It obviously does not mean that no person shall be twice
punished or put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offensetype, since a person might commit the same offense-type on several
separate occasions and be separately punishable for each. Granted,
then, that the law uses the notion of an offense-token, the question
whether it can be adequately captured by the coarse-grained theory
arises. I think not.
The only candidate for being an offense-token is being an acttoken. Under the coarse-grained theory this simply amounts to
being a basic action, or bodily movement. But this does not
adequately capture the legal notion of an offense-token, because a
person might perform multiple offense-tokens via the performance
of a single coarse-grained action. We might have an instance of
drunk driving, an instance of wrong-side-of-the-road driving, and an
instance of excessively speedy driving, and these would be three
different offense-tokens all wrapped up in a single coarse-grained
action. Thus, the coarse-grained theory by itself lacks the resources
for satisfactorily capturing the notion of offense-tokens. The finegrained approach, by contrast, easily accommodates the notion of
an offense-token. Since John's driving while drunk, John's driving
on the wrong side of the road, and John's driving at excessive speed

" U.S. CONST.

amend. V.
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are all distinct act-tokens, each violating a distinct statute, it is easy
to count each as a distinct offense-token.
The problem facing the coarse-grained theory in addressing
double-jeopardy problems is perhaps most dramatic in Moore's case
of Smith killing bothJones and Long with a single shot (and a single
basic act). As Moore notes, Smith did much more wrong in killing
bothJones and Long than he would have done if he had killed Jones
only. So Smith deserves more punishment, because of more wrongdoing. The problem for the coarse-grained theory is how it can
accommodate this notion of greater wrongdoing. There seems to
be only one wrong act-type his act-token instantiates, namely, killing
another human being. This suggests that Smith did this one wrong
(killing) more than once, that is, he performed more than one token
of this type. But this option is unavailable to the coarse-grained
theory because the theory entails that there is only one act-token
54
here.
Given the (limited) resources of his metaphysics, Moore offers
a creative solution to his difficulty. He suggests that two morally
wrong act-types are instantiated by Smith, viz., killingJonesand killing
Long. For these purposes, he says, we should individuate types, not
only by their character (killing, for example), but also by their victims.5 5 Although this creative solution may work satisfactorily for
the problem at hand, it still omits something that seems intuitively
right, namely, that Smith performs two offense-tokens in killing both
Jones and Long. This is easily captured by the fine-grained theory,
which makes its treatment of the case preferable, in my opinion.
Additional evidence for the fine-grained theory (or against a
monolithic coarse-grained theory) comes from the language used by
the court in formulating the common-law merger doctrine, which is
a court-created rule of statutory construction whereby multiple
punishment under two or more offenses is banned where such
56
offenses are committed by a single "act, transaction, or episode."
It is noteworthy that the court offered several terms here to capture
its intended meaning. Apparently it did not feel that "act" would
unambiguously capture what it meant to pick out-roughly, a coarsegrained action. So it offered the alternate terms, "transaction" and
"episode," to help convey its meaning. I suspect that this is because
the court rightly felt that "act" can be taken, and is perhaps more

5

See MOORE, supra note 1, at 361.

55 See id. at 362.
' Commonwealth v. Williams, 496 A.2d 31, 41-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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naturally taken, to refer to a fine-grained entity. Thus, the court's
language lends some support to the fine-grained view.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that courts also have
reason to refer to something like a coarse-grained action. This is,
after all, the sort of thing intended by the phrase "act, transaction,
or episode." It is essential to statutory formulations of double
jeopardy, for example, that people not be punished for lesser
included offenses of a main charge if they involve "the same act."
The phrase "same act" cannot here refer to a finely-individuated act,
because this would allow someone to be punished for committing
both battery and aggravated battery, two different fine-grained
tokens, despite throwing just one punch. In other words, finegrained individuation threatens to yield too many act-tokens for
double-jeopardy purposes; the doctrine needs some way of capturing what the coarse-grained theory seeks to capture with its
conception of action individuation.
The resources for expressing this conception, however, are
readily available within the fine-grained theory. Specifically, one can
identify the coarse-grained conception of a single act with the lowest
basic act at the root of a fine-grained act-tree, or perhaps with an
entire act-tree. 57 In other words, what the coarse-grained theory
calls a "single act" is the class of finely individuated acts that are
either level-generated by or identical to a single basic act. Thus, the
doctrine that people are not punishable for lesser-included offenses
of "the same act" might be rendered in the following fine-grained
terminology: "People should not be punished both for a greater
offense-token and for a lesser-included offense-token where both of
those offense-tokens are level-generated by or identical to the same
basic act-token." This seems to capture the intended principle in
thoroughly fine-grained fashion. It appears, then, that the finegrained theory is a superior theory, both for metaphysics generally
and for the purposes of the law. The coarse-grained theory, which
58
Moore endorses, cannot satisfy all pertinent desiderata.

See GOLDMAN,

57

HUMAN ACTION,

supra note 6, at 33-37, 56-60.

58 An alternative approach is a "double-entity" approach, which would acknowl-

edge the existence of both fine-grained and coarse-grained actions (and where the
latter are not "reduced" to trees of fine-grained actions). Perhaps this double-entity
approach is supported by the evidence from linguistics. In terms of theoretical
economy, however, a single-entity approach is preferable, and of the two options, the
fine-grained approach satisfies more desiderata, avoids more difficulties, and is more

useful in the context of the criminal law.

